A Structural Model of Child Care and the Labor Supply of Married Women by NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro & Ribar, David C.
A Structural Model of Child Care 
and the Labor Supply 
of Married Women 
David C. Ribar, Pennsylvania State University 
This article empirically examines married women's labor supply and 
child care expenditures. The article uses winter 1984-85 data from 
the Survey of Income and Program Participation to estimate a fully 
structural econometric model of labor supply and paid care utilization. 
Estimation results indicate that the cost of paid care has small negative 
effects on labor supply but stronger negative effects on paid care uti- 
lization. Consequently, subsidy programs such as the Child and De- 
pendent Care Tax Credit appear to have few effects on married 
mothers' employment. 
I. Introduction 
Issues related to child care have received extensive public discussion and 
political debate. Child care has also been the focus of numerous psycho- 
logical, sociological, and child development investigations. Economists, 
too, have recently begun to study child care. Clearly, there are many po- 
tential areas of inquiry. Several studies have examined the determinants of 
the family's choice of child care arrangement (Robins and Spiegelman 
1978; Leibowitz, Waite, and Witsberger 1988; Lehrer 1989; Hofferth and 
Wissoker 1992). Economic studies have also examined the relationship 
between child care and other economic and demographic decisions such 
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as mother's employment (Heckman 1974; Blau and Robins 1988; Ribar 
1990, 1992; Folk and Beller 1991; Averett, Peters, and Waldman 1992; 
Berger and Black 1992; Connelly 1992; Leibowitz, Klerman, and Waite 
1992; Michalopoulos, Robins, and Garfinkel 1992; Kimmel 1993), fertility 
(Lehrer and Kawasaki 1985; Blau and Robins 1989), and welfare dependence 
(Robins 1988a; Connelly 1990). Studies also have examined the broader 
market for child care services (Ruopp et al. 1979; Blau 1989, 1992; Kisker 
et al. 1989; Walker 1992). 
This study uses winter 1984-85 data from the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP) to examine family demands for paid and 
unpaid child care services and the effect of these demands on the work 
effort of married women. In so doing, the analysis explores three distinct 
questions. First, the study investigates the structure and determinants of 
child care costs and the extent to which care costs constitute a barrier to 
employment. Previous analyses have modified standard labor supply models 
to incorporate alternative descriptions of child care costs. At one level, 
these analyses are alike in predicting that the need for child care increases 
the costs of work and decreases the likelihood of labor force participation. 
Beyond this general result, however, there may be important empirical 
implications of different assumptions regarding the structure of care costs. 
Several studies (e.g., Folk and Beller 1991; Connelly 1992; Michalopoulos 
et al. 1992) have assumed that conditional on the number of children, the 
quality of care, and other demographic controls, child care enters the labor 
supply decision as a flat hourly expense with families paying a fixed amount 
for each hour the mother works.' Ignoring taxes and subsidies, such costs 
simply lower the mother's net hourly wage and are predicted to have 
negative effects on her labor force participation and ambiguous effects on 
overall hours of work. Another set of studies (Cogan 1980; Blau and Robins 
1988; Robins 1988a) have examined child care as a fixed cost of work- 
that is, as a lump sum expense which is imposed as a condition of em- 
ployment but does not vary thereafter with the level of employment. Fixed 
costs effectively reduce employed mothers' unearned incomes while leaving 
nonemployed mothers' incomes unchanged. The resulting notch in the 
budget constraint leads to a discontinuous labor supply function and dif- 
ferent effects for alternative groups of women. Specifically, fixed care costs 
are expected to reduce employment among mothers with relatively weak 
labor force attachments but increase labor supply among those with strong 
attachments. Finally, consider a description of costs that lies between these 
two extremes, where child care expenditures increase with hours of work 
but do so at a decreasing rate. As with fixed care costs, the presence of 
' In the case of Folk and Beller (1991), families pay a fixed amount for each hour 
that the parents' work schedules overlap. 
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decreasing marginal costs leads to a nonconvex budget set and, possibly, 
a discontinuous labor supply function. 
Given that each of the preceding specifications represents a theoretically 
plausible description of care expenditures, selecting the appropriate spec- 
ification becomes an empirical issue. Descriptive data from the U.S. Bureau 
of the Census (1992) suggest that child care expenditures may not vary 
linearly with labor supply. In particular, the Census Bureau reports that 
in 1988 women who worked fewer than 10 hours per week paid an average 
of $6.06 per hour for care, while women who worked 10 or more hours 
paid an average of $1.78 per hour. Unfortunately, other than the Census 
Bureau study, there is little hard evidence regarding the structure of care 
costs.2 A key task for the present study will be to examine the empirical 
relationship between child care expenditures and labor supply. 
A second important research issue is to recognize that not all working 
mothers need or use paid child care. Indeed, data from the U.S. Bureau of 
the Census (1992) indicate that in 1988, 60% of employed mothers with 
at least one child under the age of 15 and 32% of working mothers with 
a child under the age of 5 used unpaid care exclusively. Similar to most of 
the existing research on child care and women's employment, this study 
treats paid care utilization as an endogenous decision which is made si- 
multaneously with the woman's work decision. The article develops a 
model that describes the benefits, direct costs, and opportunity costs of 
paid care utilization. In the model, the principal benefit of paid care is its 
contribution to overall child quality. The monetary expense of paid services 
represents the direct cost, and the relative quality of available unpaid ar- 
rangements represents the opportunity cost of paid care. 
The model also recognizes that the relative attractiveness of paid care 
utilization may vary with hours worked (e.g., the marginal cost of paid 
care and the availability of unpaid care may both decrease with hours). 
This supposition is supported by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992) 
data which suggest that in 1988 women who were employed full-time 
were 50% more likely than women who worked part-time to use paid 
care. With the exception of Folk and Beller (1991) and Michalopoulos et 
al. (1992), previous studies of child care and work effort have not examined 
the effect of work hours on paid care utilization. 
A third goal of this article is to examine how taxes and tax subsidies 
affect married women's care utilization and labor supply decisions. The 
effect of the U.S. tax system on labor supply has been extensively researched 
2 Kimmel (1993) examined three different marginal cost specifications-average 
cost of care per hour worked, average cost per hour worked per child in paid care, 
and average cost per hour of paid care used per child. Hotz and Kilburn (1991) 
presented descriptive evidence of the determinants of total costs and average hourly 
costs per child for working and nonworking women. 
A Model of Child Care 561 
(see, e.g., Hausman 1981). There have also been attempts to investigate the 
labor supply effects of free center-based care (Robins 1988a), subsidies to 
low-income single parents (Berger and Black 1992), child care tax subsidies 
(Ribar 1990, 1992; Averett et al. 1992; Michalopoulos et al. 1992), and child 
care subsidies generally (Blau 1989). 
Taxes and subsidies introduce nonlinearities into the household budget 
constraint. As an illustration, consider the case of a married couple with 
one child in 1985 in which the couple had no unearned income, the 
husband had an annual earned income of $5,000, and the wife had an 
available wage rate of $3.50.3 Assuming that the couple paid social se- 
curity taxes, took the standard deductions, exemptions, and available 
credits, and did not pay for child care, the wife's effective budget con- 
straint is described by figure la. Examining figure la, there is a convex 
kink at hours point A (the maximum hours at which the family could 
claim the full value of the Earned Income Tax Credit [EITC]), a convex 
kink at B (the point at which the family had positive taxable income), 
and a nonconvex kink at C (the point at which the EITC would be 
exhausted). 
Figure lb depicts the same family's budget constraint but assumes 
that they paid child care costs of 75 cents for each hour the mother 
worked. In the absence of subsidies, the budget constraint has a flatter 
slope but essentially the same shape as before. However, the family 
could have reduced its tax liability by the amount of the nonrefundable 
Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit (CDCTC).4 In this case, the 
CDCTC would exceed the family's tax liability at every point along 
the budget constraint. Thus, once the EITC was exhausted, the family 
would pay only the social security tax, resulting again in a nonconvex 
kink at C. 
Estimation of care utilization and labor supply functions becomes sub- 
stantially more complicated in the presence of nonlinear budget constraints 
like those described earlier and those depicted in figures la and lb. One 
obvious complication involves the computation of effective wage rates, 
3 These figures are obviously not representative of all families. The figures were 
selected to demonstrate the interaction of tax and subsidy programs for low-income 
families. There are other kinks and notches in the budget constraints for middle- 
and upper-income families. 
4 The CDCTC ranges from 30% of eligible child care expenditures for families 
that earn less than $10,000 per year to 20% of care expenditures for families that 
earn more than $28,000. Eligible expenditures are $2,400 per year for one child 
and $4,800 for two or more children. Thus, the maximum credit is $720 for one 
child or $1,440 for two or more children. However, due to its nonrefundability, 
few families receive these maximum amounts. In 1985 the CDCTC cost the federal 
government $3.128 million (U.S. Department of the Treasury 1988). This represents 
roughly 60% of all federal child care expenditures for 1985. 
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marginal costs, and incomes. Another problem is that families' observed 
locations along the budget set depend on their preferences and are not 
generated entirely at random. Thus, the estimation procedure must account 
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for the possibility of self-selection in the effective wages and mar- 
ginal costs.5 
Previous child care studies have adopted different strategies in trying to 
correct for this type of selectivity. Ribar (1990) and Michalopoulos et al. 
(1992) estimated partially structural models and used instruments for after- 
tax wages and care costs. In principle, structural estimators derived directly 
from the family's preference function facilitate nonlinear budget constraint 
estimation by providing an explicit representation of the source of selec- 
tivity. Structural methods also yield estimates of preference parameters 
which are independent of the budget constraint, thereby facilitating detailed 
policy simulation. Unfortunately, neither Michalopoulos et al. nor Ribar 
implemented the full set of restrictions implied by their respective structural 
models; moreover, neither study estimated all of the preference parameters 
necessary for simulation exercises.6 Using an alternative econometric ap- 
proach, Averett et al. (1992) examined the labor supply effects of care costs 
and the CDCTC. Their model incorporated all of the selectivity restrictions 
implied by nonlinearities in the convex portion of the CDCTC. However, 
the model did not consider any other features of the tax system and did 
not address the endogeneity of paid care utilization. 
This article estimates a fully structural, discrete-choice model of married 
mothers' care arrangements and labor supply. In particular, the article 
develops a full-information maximum likelihood specification which relies 
on direct utility comparisons over women's decisions to work zero, part- 
time, or full-time hours and utilize paid or unpaid care. This approach 
extends the previous work of Michalopoulos et al. and Ribar by providing 
estimates of all of the relevant utility parameters and by allowing effective 
wages and care costs to vary across alternative work and care utilization 
states. Unlike Averett et al., the article's empirical specification incorporates 
general features of the tax system including nonconvex regions of 
the CDCTC. 
Estimation reveals that married women's labor supply is relatively sen- 
sitive to changes in hourly wages but insensitive to changes in care costs. 
Among employed women who pay for care, an increase in care costs ap- 
'Appropriate estimation methods are reviewed by Hausman (1985) and Moffitt 
(1 990). 
6 Michalopoulos et al. (1992) estimated structural care expenditure and labor 
supply functions conditional on reduced-form labor force participation and paid 
care utilization equations. Their procedure did not explicitly examine the deter- 
minants of unpaid arrangements. Ribar (1990) estimated structural paid and unpaid 
care utilization equations conditional on a reduced-form specification for labor 
supply; his study did not examine the structural determinants of work decisions. 
Both studies used an instrumental variables approach which eliminated the en- 
dogeneity of wages and prices but did not incorporate budget-induced selectivity 
restrictions. 
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pears to increase the attractiveness of unpaid nonmaternal arrangements 
rather than maternal care. Overall, mothers with preschool-age children 
are found to be less sensitive to wage and care cost changes than other 
mothers. Simulations based on the article's structural estimates are con- 
ducted to examine the behavioral implications of alternative tax and subsidy 
policies. The simulations indicate that the existing CDCTC has a modest 
positive effect on labor supply and a stronger positive effect on paid care 
uti1 zation. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section II develops 
a conceptual model of child care and hours of work. An empirical rep- 
resentation of that model is derived in Section III. Section IV describes 
the data sources and the analysis extract. Estimation results and policy 
simulations appear in Section V. The paper concludes in Section VI. 
II. Conceptual Model 
Consider a 1-period model in which a family has preferences over market 
goods, C, the quality of care extended to its children, Q, and the mother's 
hours devoted to nonmarket activities, L.7 Let those preferences be rep- 
resented by a direct utility function, U = U(C, Q, L) where utility is in- 
creasing in C, Q, and L. The labor force participation of the father is 
assumed to be predetermined and, hence, exogenous. The static framework 
also implicitly treats the parents' prior family formation, fertility, education, 
and savings behavior as exogenous variables. 
Denote the mother's hours spent working in the market by H. The 
mother's total available time, K, can be divided between market and non- 
market activities such that 
K = H + L. (1) 
Nonmarket hours, L, are defined to include maternal child care, other 
household production activities, and leisure. 
Besides the care they receive from their mother, children can receive 
care from paid and unpaid sources.8 Let F be a dichotomous variable which 
7 Because the model effectively examines only one decision maker, it can easily 
be extended to single-parent families. The article's focus is limited to married 
mothers for reasons of sample homogeneity and tractability. Married and single 
mothers face very different opportunity sets. Married mothers have the potential 
time and income resources of their husbands. Married mothers' budget constraints 
are also less likely to be complicated by transfer kinks. 
8 Limiting the family's choice set to paid and unpaid arrangements represents a 
strong, restrictive assumption. The reduced choice set may group together very 
different types of care. The caution applies more to paid than unpaid care. Kisker 
et al. (1989) found that unpaid arrangements generally represented unregulated 
care by relatives and neighbors. In contrast, paid care contains three qualitatively 
distinct arrangements-licensed (regulated) care, other nonrelative care, and relative 
care. The restriction to paid and unpaid care is imposed in this article for com- 
parability with existing research and for tractability of the econometric model. 
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equals one if the family utilizes any paid care and which equals zero if the 
family utilizes maternal or unpaid nonmaternal care exclusively. Total care 
quality for the family's children depends on inputs of maternal care, paid 
and unpaid nonmaternal care, and other goods. Specifically, let 
Q - Q(L, F, C; aQ), (2) 
where aQ represents a set of conditioning factors (e.g., number and age 
distribution of children, parents' education, safety of the children's neigh- 
borhood) which affect the production of care quality. Care quality is as- 
sumed to increase with inputs of maternal care and market goods. The 
contribution of F to overall quality is ambiguous and depends on the 
quality of paid care relative to maternal and unpaid nonmaternal care. For 
simplicity, the relative quality of paid care conditional on aQ, L, and C is 
assumed be exogenously determined.9 
Paid child care is priced in terms of consumption goods, C. Let the cost 
of paid care services be given by PF = PF(H; ap), where costs depend on 
the mother's hours of work and a set of conditioning factors, cap. Families 
are assumed to take the cost schedule as given. Letting W represent the 
mother's available hourly wage rate, the budget set can be expressed as 
C = WH + N-PF(H; ap)F = Y(H, F), (3) 
where N denotes nonlabor income and Y denotes total income. The earn- 
ings of others in the household aside from the mother are included in N 
and taken to be exogenous. 
Notice that paid care utilization enters the model in two ways. Market 
care services may enter beneficially as an input to the production of child 
care quality. Market services also appear in the budget constraint and are 
assigned an explicit cost PF. In contrast, unpaid services enter the model 
only as an input to the production of quality. Thus, the decision to utilize 
paid or unpaid care depends only on the absolute cost and relative quality 
of paid care. The availability and possible nonpecuniary cost (e.g., room 
and board, reciprocating time transfers) of unpaid care are not explicitly 
considered. 
To remedy this omission, this article assumes that nonmarket care is 
available to all families at some indirect cost and respecifies the model to 
include such costs.'0 In particular, let the indirect cost of unpaid care be 
9Thus, other than conditioning on cQ, L, and C, this approach makes no dis- 
tinction between high- and low-quality paid care. A further limitation is that the 
approach does not consider alternative dimensions of "quality" such as convenience 
and dependability. 
10 Descriptions and evaluations of alternative restrictions appear in Ribar (1990). 
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the value of the care provider's time in alternative activities. This description 
provides a suitable measure of the availability of unpaid care. If nonmarket 
care is provided for some nonpecuniary consideration, the indirect cost 
could capture the value of this transaction as well. 
Indirect costs might be incorporated into the model in one of two ways. 
First, indirect costs could enter as a shadow expense into the family's level 
of consumption. This explicit representation of indirect costs has the ad- 
vantage of providing a symmetric treatment of paid and unpaid care. Un- 
fortunately, the approach requires that the budget constraint be modified 
to include a "full income" measure for the caregiver's other potential con- 
tributions to the household. An alternative approach which is adopted by 
this article is to incorporate indirect costs directly into the utility function. 
Specifically, the article reexpresses the preference function as U = U(C, 
Q. L, F), where utility increases in consumption goods, care quality, leisure, 
and paid care utilization (i.e., decreases in unpaid care utilization). The 
(dis)utility term acts as a flexible and tractable proxy for the indirect costs 
of unpaid care. Indeed, the term nests the properties of the shadow cost 
approach. The chief disadvantage of the utility approach is that it is theo- 
retically clumsy. While the modified utility function captures the effects 
of indirect costs, there is no reason to suppose that families actually have 
direct negative preferences regarding unpaid care. 
With this modification, the family's decision can now be modeled as a 
standard maximization problem. Let the choice variables be H and F. 
Substituting equations (1), (2), and (3) into the utility specification, the 
family's problem becomes 
max U = U{Y(H, F), Q[K - H, F, Y(H, F); ctQ], K - H, F}, (4) 
H,F 
subject to nonnegativity constraints for the two choice variables. 
Assuming that the budget constraint is convex and that (4) is differen- 
tiable, the first-order condition for (4) with respect to H can be manipulated 
to produce an expression for the mother's reservation wage. Substituting 
H = 0 into the first-order condition and expressing the condition as an 
equality yields 
W - 9PF +UQQL 
+ UL 5 
WR= +HI UQQC + UC H=O 
where Uc, UQ, UL, Qc, and QL represent the partial derivatives of the 
utility and quality production functions with respect to the subscripted 
arguments. Several conditional comparative static results can be derived 
for the reservation wage. Holding nonmaternal child care utilization con- 
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stant, equations (4) and (5) imply that the reservation wage decreases with 
the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal contribution of con- 
sumption goods to care quality. The reservation wage increases with the 
marginal cost of paid care, the marginal utility of nonmarket time, and 
the marginal contribution of nonmarket time to care quality. These con- 
ditional results are similar to the predictions generated by Blau and 
Robins (1988). 
An expression for the reservation expenditure on paid care can also be 
derived. Define P* to be the level of paid care expenditures that leave 
families indifferent between utilizing paid and unpaid care. Writing PF* as 
an implicit function, PF satisfies 
U{WH+N-PF*,Q[K-H, 1, WH+N-PF*;aQ],K-H, 1} (6) 
= U{WH + N, Q[K - H, 0, WH + N; aQ], K - H, O}. 
The likelihood of paid care utilization increases with the marginal utility 
of paid care and the marginal contribution of paid care to overall child 
quality. Families are less likely to use paid care if their preferences for 
consumption are strong or the marginal contribution of market goods to 
child quality is high. 
III. Econometric Specification 
The article derives a structural econometric model which is based on 
direct utility comparisons over different care utilization and labor supply 
alternatives. To obtain its econometric specification, the article imposes 
several restrictions on the theoretical model. First, the article adopts a 
parametric specification for the family's preference function. Note that 
the objective function in (4) can be written as a function of income, labor 
supply, and paid care utilization. The article expresses the objective function 
as a generalized quadratic in these three arguments such that 
max U = U(Y(H, F), H, F) 
H,F 
= Y(H, F) - OcY(H, F)2 + hH - OhH2 (7 
+ IfF + YchY(H, F)H 
+ YcfY(H, F)F + yhfHF. 
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Specification (7) can be interpreted as a flexible approximation to (4) in 
which the coefficients represent combinations of utility and care quality 
production parameters.1' 
Second, the article restricts the family's choice set by limiting the mother's 
possible labor supply outcomes to zero, part-time, or full-time hours and 
by assuming that families with nonworking mothers utilize no paid care.'2 
These restrictions imply that each family chooses from among five options: 
(1) mother does not work, (2) mother works part-time and uses unpaid 
care exclusively, (3) mother works full-time and uses unpaid care exclu- 
sively, (4) mother works part-time and uses paid care, and (5) mother 
works full-time and uses paid care. 
As written, specification (7) implies that differences in mothers' care 
utilization and labor supply decisions are generated entirely by differences 
in their effective wages, care costs, and unearned incomes. The article in- 
troduces additional heterogeneity into (7) by respecifying the marginal 
parameters on hours of work and the interaction of hours of work and 
paid care to be functions of observed and unobserved components. That 
is, let 
Ph = 6Z + l, and Yhf = VX +, (8) 
where Z and X are vectors of observed determinants and fl and E are error 
terms. The error terms are assumed to follow a bivariate normal distribution 
such that 
Ng [1[ 7 i (9) 
With these assumptions, derivation of a maximum likelihood estimation 
method is straightforward. Specifically, data on families' care and maternal 
employment decisions provide information on their relative valuations of 
the five options. The choice of a particular option implies that the utility 
associated with that option is at least as great as the utility associated with 
each of the other options. Pairwise comparisons of the utility functions 
I X Though flexible, the generalized quadratic specification has some disadvantages. 
The function is not globally concave and not guaranteed to be increasing in income 
across its entire range. Ribar (1990) discusses alternative utility specifications. 
12 The first restriction is imposed for tractability. The second reflects a data con- 
straint-care utilization is unobserved for nonworking mothers in the SIPP-and 
may not be entirely reasonable. Using data from the National Longitudinal Study 
of the High School Class of 1972, Hotz and Kilburn (1991) found that nearly a 
quarter of nonworking married mothers with preschool-age children used some 
form of nonparental care. 
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lead to a set of truncation restrictions on the error terms rj and ?. These 
restrictions combined with the distributional assumptions (9) in turn yield 
parametric descriptions of the probabilities associated with each choice. 
Let dij be a binary variable which equals one if family i selects choice j and 
zero otherwise. For a sample of N families, the likelihood function is 
given by 
N - 5 
LF= 171 d,;j prob(d, = 1)]. (10) 
i=1 j=1 
Precise descriptions of the choice probabilities in (10) are provided in ap- 
pendix A. 
The likelihood function is maximized using the algorithm developed by 
Berndt et al. (1974). Some complications arise, however, in applying this 
procedure. In particular, the utility comparisons yield truncation conditions 
which are piecewise linear functions in the error terms. Thus, the choice 
probabilities in (10) must be evaluated using numerical methods.' More- 
over, the presence of kinks in the truncation conditions implies there are 
points in the parameter space where the likelihood function is not differ- 
entiable. Such nondifferentiability can lead to convergence and inference 
problems in the Berndt et al. procedure.' 
Similar models based on direct utility comparisons have been used in 
other studies (e.g., Fraker and Moffitt 1988; Keane and Moffitt 1991; Moffitt 
and Wolfe 1992). Like those models, the present specification is essentially 
a nonlinear multinomial choice model. The specification is fully structural 
in the sense that estimates of all of the relevant objective function parameters 
from (7), (8), and (9)-namely, Of, o Oh, ,Ych, Ycf, 6, Ai, C, Cy, and Pa-are 
identified. Identification is secured through functional and distributional 
assumptions which lead to nonlinearities in (10). In addition, the article 
employs exclusion restrictions on the vectors Z and X. Along with pro- 
viding estimates of the preference parameters, the structural procedure 
allows effective wages and care costs to vary across alternatives. The pro- 
cedure can also be applied to nonconvex budget sets. The chief disadvantage 
of the specification is the restricted choice set. Unfortunately, expanding 
the number of care and work alternatives results in more complicated error 
truncation conditions. 
There are two remaining data issues. First, available wages are unobserved 
for mothers who are not employed. The analysis imputes selectivity- 
13The article employs 6-point Gaussian and Laguerre quadrature techniques 
(Davis and Rabinowitz 1975). 
14 In practice, the estimation procedure did not exhibit these problems. Conver- 
gence was relatively rapid, and the final parameter estimates did not fall on any 
boundaries. 
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corrected estimates of hourly wage rates to all mothers. Let wages be 
given by 
InW=A'M+v, (11) 
where M represents observed determinants and v is a normally distributed 
error term. Equation (11) is estimated jointly with a labor force participation 
probit using maximum likelihood (Maddala 1983). 
Estimating the determinants of paid care expenditures raises similar se- 
lectivity concerns. In the data, the care utilization decisions of nonworking 
women are not recorded. Expenditure amounts are also not observed for 
families who utilize unpaid care exclusively. In addition, expenditures over 
$100 per week are censored. Let expenditures on child care be a general 
function of hours of work, other observed determinants, and unobserved 
determinants such that 
In PF= g(H, D; A) +, (12) 
where D is a vector of observed variables, A is a vector of coefficients, and 
4 is a normally distributed error term. Maximum likelihood is used to 
estimate the nonlinear expenditure specification (12) jointly with reduced- 
form labor supply and care utilization equations. The econometric pro- 
cedure accounts for the possible endogeneity of H, selectivity from H and 
F, and censoring. A detailed description of the likelihood function appears 
in appendix B."5 
To identify the wage and price parameters in the model, exclusion re- 
strictions are imposed on the vectors M and D and on the exogenous 
determinants of H and F. The model assumes that wages are a function 
of human capital, regional variation, and demand effects. Demand effects 
as measured by the local unemployment rate and average annual wage rate 
for private employers are assumed to have little direct effect on the decision 
variables and thus appear in the wage determinants only. The cost of market 
child care is assumed to be a function of quality, supply cost, and regional 
variation. From this list, supply cost, as measured by the local average 
salary for service workers, appears to be a reasonable candidate for iden- 
tifcation. 
IV. Data 
The primary empirical source for the analysis is the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation. The SIPP is a nationally representative longi- 
15 The article's imputation procedure for wages and care costs may be inappro- 
priate because these variables enter the estimation function nonlinearly. 
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tudinal sample that contains a wealth of demographic, income, and labor 
supply information. Observations are drawn from wave 5 of the 1984 
panel which was fielded during the winter of 1984-85. Among the data 
collected in wave 5 were responses to a series of questions concerning 
child care. 
In the SIPP, the available economic data include hours of work and 
earned and unearned income for everyone in the household 15 years of 
age and older. For this article, monthly totals for the economic variables 
are computed for the last full month prior to the interview date. The 
mother's monthly pretax unearned income is computed by aggregating 
the family's reported unearned income with the earned incomes of all 
other family members. Monthly hours of work and earned income are 
computed for "salaried" mothers (families with self-employed mothers are 
excluded from the extract). 
The actual hourly wage rate for employed mothers is obtained by dividing 
monthly earned income by monthly hours. Parameter estimates from the 
selectivity-corrected log wage equation are used to predict pretax wages 
for each mother in the sample. Estimation results for the log wage equation 
appear in appendix C. 
Applicable demographic variables drawn from the SIPP include the 
composition of the household, the ages and educational attainment of its 
members, the race of the household head, and the household location. The 
SIPP also contains information on the cost and utilization of child care 
arrangements. For employed mothers, child care data were recorded for 
the three youngest children under the age of 15 for 1 week in the month 
prior to the interview. Available information for each child includes the 
primary and secondary care mode choice. Data are also reported for fam- 
ilies' total weekly child care expenditures. For families that utilize paid 
services, the article projects care expenditures to a monthly aggregate. 
Parameter estimates from selectivity- and endogeneity-corrected expen- 
diture equations are used to predict pretax part-time and full-time care 
costs for each family. Estimation results are discussed in the next section. 
The econometric analysis uses after-tax measures of monthly income 
with and without paid care expenditures at zero, part-time, and full-time 
hours. Monthly part-time hours are assumed to equal 86.6 (20 hours per 
week for 4.33 weeks), and full-time hours are assumed to equal 173.2 (40 
hours per week for 4.33 weeks).'6 For each of the five joint care and work 
categories, taxes are estimated by projecting the monthly pretax income 
to an annual total; allowing for the standard deduction, exemptions, and 
marriage penalty exclusion; computing the appropriate federal income tax 
amount (less the EITC and CDCTC, if applicable); computing the appli- 
16 These round figures are close to the conditional mean hours of work for part- 
and full-time workers (21 and 41 hours, respectively) from the sample. 
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cable social security taxes; and dividing by 12. After-tax income then equals 
pretax income less estimated income and social security taxes. 
The SIPP data include an important conditioning factor for the quality 
of care-the age of the child under care. Children of different ages require 
different types of care (Ruopp et al. 1979; Leibowitz et al. 1988). Younger 
children need to be monitored more intensively, in smaller groups than 
do older children. Educational requirements also vary by age. Differences 
in states' regulatory vigilance are used as additional indicators of quality 
(U.S. Department of Labor 1988). Variables include flags for states with 
relatively low mandated center child:staff ratios for 3-year-olds (ratios less 
than or equal to 10:1), states that check criminal and child abuse records 
of potential caregivers, and states that license and inspect family day 
care homes. 
Two additional measures have been collected externally. The largest 
cost factor in paid care is wages paid to caregivers. Indeed, personnel 
expenses accounted for 69% of organized center costs in the 1976-77 Na- 
tional Day Care Survey (Ruopp et al. 1979). The article has obtained 1985 
data on annual average salaries for service workers and all private employees 
in each state from the U.S. Department of Commerce Regional Economic 
Information System. Service worker wages are used to proxy differences 
in care provider wages between states. Total private earnings are taken to 
be a measure of local labor demand and cost of living conditions. 
Means for the analysis variables are presented in table 1. Table 1 also 
lists means conditional on child care arrangement and mother's labor force 
participation. The analysis extract contains observations for 3,769 married 
families with at least one child under the age of 15. Among these families, 
1,983 had a mother who worked. Of the families with employed mothers, 
649 reported using some form of paid care, and 1,334 reported using no 
paid care. Mothers who worked part-time were much less likely to utilize 
paid care than women who worked full-time (23% vs. 40%).7 
V. Results 
A. Child Care Expenditures 
Table 2 reports the results of three alternative specifications of the care 
expenditure equation (12). The three specifications are all restricted versions 
of the following model: 
In PF= A'D + AhO In(Afo + H) + (13) 
"A complete descriptive analysis of the data set appears in Ribar (1990). A 
general analysis of child care variables from the SIPP is given in U.S. Bureau of 
the Census (1987b). 
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In the first specification in table 2, Aho = 1 and Afo = 0; thus, similar to 
much of the existing literature, care costs are modeled as a flat hourly 
expense. Consistent with expectations, small children appear to have a 
strong positive effect on expenditures; older children have a weaker positive 
effect. Expenditures are higher for urban residents and residents of states 
with higher service worker wages. Expenditures are lower for residents of 
the South. One unexpected result is the significant negative coefficient on 
residence in a state with a low mandated child:staff ratio. The other two 
state-level quality variables are statistically insignificant. 
The second specification in table 2 tests the linearity assumption from 
the previous model by relaxing the restriction on Aho and allowing expen- 
ditures to be a smooth nonlinear function in hours of work. The results 
strongly reject the assumption of linearity. In particular, the estimate on 
Aho is significantly less than one, and the log likelihood increases substan- 
tially. The coefficient estimate indicates that child care expenditures increase 
with hours but at a decreasing rate. To provide a clearer picture of the 
implications of these results, table 3 reports the predicted expenditures 
under specifications 1 and 2 at alternative hours points using sample means 
for the independent variables. Although both specifications lead to similar 
predictions of full-time expenditures, the part-time costs generated by 
specification 2 are higher than those generated by specification 1. 
The third specification in table 2 presents an alternative test of the lin- 
earity assumption in which AhO is set at one but the restriction on Afo is 
relaxed. This corresponds to an expenditure function with both fixed and 
linear marginal components. As in specification 2, the linearity assumption 
is strongly rejected. The estimates indicate that the average fixed costs of 
paid child care are $92 per month ($21 per week) and that the marginal 
costs are $0.83 per hour. In table 3, the predicted full-time costs associated 
with specification 3 are again similar to those from the linear specification. 
The predicted costs at 86.6 hours are almost identical to the predictions 
from specification 2. 
Predicted expenditure/hours profiles from three other specifications are 
listed at the bottom of table 3. For brevity, individual coefficient estimates 
for these models are not listed. In specification 4, the log expenditure 
equation has been rewritten to include generally parameterized fixed and 
linear marginal components such that 
In PF= A'D + A'DH + (14) 
The predicted fixed costs are substantially higher and the implied marginal 
costs are much lower than in the previous specifications. Nevertheless, the 
predicted full-time expenditures from specification 4 are similar to those 
reported for the previous specifications. 
\ ,) -> ->~0 C, C-A -I-> - - > rl "o Lr) Ln LnLr 
?, Lf Lno Lnesoooo 00 o0 c ._~~~~~~0 C3 'I 00 Lr N ee> oN o o N 
En r- "o 4 C) C- 3 on 00 oo~ C- r i WC~ON 4 C~NoO0OO 't O~f <, r ' 
t t 
?' oo N ' r (ON 4oo ( oo- o  
E.- (ON ??, (O fl *I , Ln 0 (N Ln r 
000 L; C -i/ 
\~~~~~~~~~~ (O 
( 
ICnl:) ) L)O 
CIA r- rI r 1l fl aO rI " r" -4 a 
O 
A 00 (ON rA-t CI -t r oo 
'.6 C-1 ~ C 
s~~~~~~~~~~~L Ln rA r 
3~~~~~I .l .- .l -t CI , , "o (N CII fl) r- " 0 " 
00 
Wo~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~L 
z 
4 
O N bl N bl t
N N~ 4 N~ 00 Nu uN bn 
0) 
? t o . O 4 bl e N oo wO Nmi4. 1. 14 
E ~ ~~~~~~~ Ln <q u , 
'40 o 5 I I I 
0 o X 4 X X X X 
0 0 
r 
0) 
-t 
0) 0) 0) 0) 
S m Q m ; ._ 0 ._ ._ ._ 
D 
0 
:8 
< 00 C, 
o . 
r, 
ct; 0 
-;> :> S ?S ? t 
574 
a'(N -f>00\ a'0 -- Lf 
-> 
-a' N ~ a -> 
1 00 N N r 0 r O 000 3 It Lf) 00 en en 'I- '1 'I- 
( N N a'( bioo(biN a' 
00/\( -N (N1 t ( ''f 
(I el . I 0. 
. 
.... . ... . . . . 
0'-a - (ON - 00o 00N C 1a0 - c\O 'IC 
ri oo'- a'( N (o sN N oo sr 
t 1001(N Lt 00 en r 0 o C 0'- 
C 
(al(NlO\O a *s 
0 - C 0 al Lf0 a0 LfL- N1- ~ -~ 
as C r, "O "O r4 (o I- cn C) 
r 
rl cr all ND I- rn t 
CN' en oo00 r - rN? 
t 
e O ~~~o r-I cn "O aC ,O 00 'I (D 'I cr 'I ? 
00 (:, (N 00 C) Of 'IC s t t 0 . . . Z . . . . n .q . . . . . . . . 0 
rl - rlc 00 - al rl r" . 
(N Lf (N 00 'I r4 Ln GO en Lf 
a 
3 ,O all C- r- p 'I Oao 
C1 en en 00 "O N Nl- 
0 d 
3~~ ' - ;a C,5 0 2S 
7~~~~~~~~7 
~~~ 0 0~$. 
7 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .-~ U ~ ~ -~ U 
S- 
S ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~. 
575~~~~~ 
576 Ribar 
Table 2 
Child Care Expenditure Estimation Results 
Specifications 
Parameters (1) (2) (3) 
A, = intercept -.9096*** 2.1339*** -1.0049*** 
(.2351) (.4461) (.2160) 
A2 = number of children 0-2 years of age .4485*** .1804*** .1807*** 
(.0569) (.0628) (.0631) 
A3 = number of children 3-5 years of age .3891*** .1702*** .1727*** 
(.0463) (.0485) (.0490) 
A4 = number of children 6-10 years of age .0968*** .0671* .0648* 
(.0362) (.0364) (.0358) 
A5 = average annual service earnings in statea .0467*** .0432*** .0414*** 
(.0127) (.0127) (.0125) 
A6 = mandated child:staff ratio -.1169** ,7.1438*** -.1496*** 
(.0529) (.0544) (.0547) 
A7 = state checks criminal records of 
caregivers -.0026 -.0037 -.0029 
(.0609) (.0625) (.0630) 
A8 = state regulates family home day care -.0428 -.0645 -.0605 
(.0465) (.0486) (.0490) 
A9 = South -.1330** -.1399** -.1482** 
(.0576) (.0594) (.0596) 
A10 = metropolitan area .0904* .1090* .1150** 
(.0541) (.0563) (.0563) 
AM, 1.0000 .4795*** 1.0000 
(.0648) 
AfO ... ... 110.9155*** 
(31.4585) 
.5459*** .5969*** .6002 * * * 
(.0249) (.0326) (.0337) 
Pi -.3789*** .0020 -.0127 
(.0653) (.0903) (.0926) 
P2 -.4072*** -.6392*** -.6447*** 
(.1168) (.0728) (.0723) 
Log likelihood -14,760.59 -14,739.27 -14,744.97 
Number of observations 3,750 
NOTE.-Standard errors appear in parentheses. The likelihood function appears in appendix B. Log 
expenditure equations are estimated jointly with an hours equation and a paid care utilization equation. 
The hours equation includes the variables listed above, plus age, age2, experience, xperience2, mother's 
and father's education, race, monthly unearned income, number of adults, state unemployment rate, and 
average annual private-sector earnings in state. The care utilization equation includes the same variables 
as does the hours equation with the exception of the state unemployment rate. 
Variable has been divided by 1,000. 
* Significant a the .10 level. 
** Significant a the .05 level. 
*** Significant a the .01 level. 
Specification 5 appends a quadratic term in hours to (14) so that log 
expenditures depend on a fixed component and a nonlinear variable com- 
ponent. The significant increase in the likelihood value indicates that spec- 
ification 4 should be rejected in favor of specification 5. The predicted 
fixed cost from specification 5 is similar to the fixed cost from specification 
3. Predicted full-time expenditures are also close to previous estimates. 
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In the final specification, the observed determinants of expenditures are 
parameterized to have separate effects depending on whether the mother 
works full- or part-time. The cutoff between full- and part-time employ- 
ment is defined as 151.5 hours per month (35 hours per week). Specification 
6 yields predictions of full-time expenditures which are similar to the full- 
time (173.2 hours) predictions from the previous models. Predicted part- 
time expenditures from specification 6 are higher than the previous pre- 
dictions at 86.6 hours. 
Choosing the best specification from the six listed in table 3 is problem- 
atic because not all of the models are nested. Clearly, specification 1 is 
rejected in favor of either specification 2 or 3, and specification 4 is rejected 
in favor of specification 5. Beyond this point, however, nested comparisons 
are not possible. While predictions of full-time costs do not appear to be 
sensitive to the choice of model, there is considerable variation in the 
predicted part-time costs. In its imputations, the article uses specification 
5 because it has the most general parameterization and yields a prediction 
for part-time xpenditures which is in the middle of the range of estimates." 
B. Structural Care Utilization and Labor Supply Results 
Table 4 reports results from four specifications of the structural econo- 
metric model. The first specification in table 4 is a restricted model in 
which the interaction terms ye,, and y~f and the marginal parameter on paid 
care utilization, 3f, are set to zero. Thus, the family's objective function in 
specification 1 is a standard quadratic in income and hours of work with 
an interaction between hours of work and paid care utilization. 
The first 10 coefficients (68-680) in table 4 represent the effects of the 
listed variables on ph, the marginal parameter on hours of work. A positive 
coefficient indicates that the variable has a positive effect on labor supply. 
For specification 1, standard results obtain. Labor supply decreases with 
the number of small children, the mother's age, and residence in a met- 
ropolitan area. Work experience, residence in the South, and being non- 
white are estimated to have positive effects on labor supply. 
The next fourteen coefficients (-iY14) give the effects of the listed vari- 
ables on the interaction between paid care utilization and hours of work. 
Positive coefficients are indicative of factors which make paid arrangements 
more attractive as labor supply increases. As expected, the number of small 
children, the mother's education, and residence in a metropolitan area 
increase the likelihood of paid care utilization. The mother's age and the 
number of adults in the household are estimated to have negative effects 
on paid care usage. As in the expenditure results, coefficients on the state- 
level policy variables provide mixed support for hypotheses regarding care 
18 The estimates from the structural model are not sensitive to the choice of 
specifications 2, 3, 5, or 6. 
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quality. While residence in a state that checks caregivers' criminal and 
child abuse backgrounds is associated with higher paid care utilization, 
residence in a state that regulates family home day care appears to decrease 
the attractiveness of paid care. 
The next two parameters, 0, and 0h, are the coefficients on the quadratic 
terms for income and hours of work. Both coefficients are positive and 
significant, indicating that the family's objective function is concave in 
income and labor supply.19 The final coefficients reported for specification 
1 are the distributional parameters for , and il. Of note is the strong negative 
correlation between the unobserved determinants of labor supply and paid 
care interacted with labor supply. 
The second specification in table 4 relaxes the restrictions on Ych, Ycf, 
and rf and, thus, represents a fully parameterized version of the family's 
objective function. This specification allows for a richer set of cross-sub- 
stitution effects than does the previous model. The added coefficients are 
individually and jointly significant. When the results are examined more 
closely, almost all of the coefficients and variance parameters increase in 
magnitude from specification 1 to specification 2. Although a few coeffi- 
cients lose their significance, most of the substantive results from specifi- 
cation 1 are maintained. The changes in the coefficient estimates are likely 
the result of multicollinearity from the interaction terms. 
In the third and fourth columns of table 4, specifications 1 and 2 are 
reestimated using a subsample of married women with at least one child 
under the age of 6. Mothers of small children are examined because their 
care constraints are likely to be more pressing than the constraints for 
mothers of older children. The precise behavioral implications of these 
constraints, however, are unclear. On the one hand, the salience of the 
child care constraint might lead mothers of preschoolers to be more sen- 
sitive to changes in care costs. On the other hand, limited care options 
might decrease this group's observed sensitivity to changes in costs. The 
results from specifications 3 and 4 appear to be consistent with this second 
hypothesis. 
Overall, the coefficient estimates from specification 3 are weaker than 
their counterparts from specification 1. Among the labor supply parameters, 
the number of children from ages 6 to 10, residence in the South, and 
residence in an urban area lose their significance. The coefficients for the 
number of small children and the mother's age remain negative and sig- 
nificant; the coefficients on work experience and race remain positive and 
significant. When we turn to the paid care utilization parameters, the num- 
ber of small children, the mother's age and education, residence in an 
19 The size of 0, further implies that utility increases up to annual incomes of 
about $222,000 and, thus, increases across the range of net incomes recorded and 
projected in the sample. 
Table 4 
Child Care Utilization Estimation Results: Structural Labor Supply 
Women with Children Women with Children 
under 15 Years of Age under 6 Years of Age 
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) 
8, = constant 2.174*** 8.677** 2.018 12.224 
(.757) (3.697) (1.389) (10.389) 
32 = number of children 0-2 
years of age -2.773*** -7.592*** -2.211*** -8.408 
(.250) (2.311) (.439) (5.695) 
33 = number of children 3-5 
years of age -1.658*** -4.645**4 -.851** -3.303 
(.207) (1.504) (.337) (2.503) 
34 number of children 6-10 
years of age -.428*** -1.094** .141 -.571 
(.121) (.440) (.262) (1.019) 
35 = mother's age -.151 * * * -.3760 K * -.250*** -.936 
(.020) (.114) (.054) (.676) 
66 = mother's education .049 .3460 * .131 1.238 
(.044) (.171) (.093) (.999) 
37= nonwhite 1.369*** 3.809*** 1.998*** 9.181 
(.292) (1.347) (.580) (6.817) 
38 = South .633*** 1.595** .586 3.835 
(.193) (.677) (.414) (3.296) 
39 = metropolitan area -.350* -.564 -.229 -.510 
(.195) (.536) (.358) (1.326) 
310=experience .213*** .611*** .360*** 1.673 
(.022) (.183) (.078) (1.251) 
= constant 1.776*-i* 6.884X*' 1.523 3.720* 
(.555) (2.570) (1.080) (2.251) 
V2 = number of children 0-2 
years of age 1.489**K 4.443::** .160 .468 
(.309) (1.711) (.275) (.312) 
= number of children 3-5 
years of age 1.440*** 4.002** -.0005 .208 
(.304) (1.555) (.261) (.210) 
J4 = number of children 6-10 
years of age .012 .195 -.683** -.326 
(.093) (.241) (.338) (.219) 
5 mother's age -.068*** -.173** .009 -.002 
(.019) (.071) (.025) (.017) 
6 = mother's education .058* .059 .111 -.015 
(.034) (.082) (.084) (.048) 
7 = nonwhite .150 -.053 .454 -.012 
(.196) (.517) (.403) (.251) 
8 = South -.055 -.121 .688 .354 
(.162) (.417) (.471) (.322) 
9 = metropolitan area .238* .303 -.150 -.126 
(.142) (.379) (.295) (.232) 
I = number of adults -.281*** -.623** -.276* -.206 
(.090) (.282) (.158) (.139) 
= husband's education -.019 -.046 -.079 -.028 
(.025) (.063) (.057) (.040) 
I12 = mandated child:staff ratio -.223 -.434 -.050 .061 
(.136) (.344) (.265) (.221) 
VI13 = state checks criminal 
records of caregivers .264* .559 .146 -.032 
(.154) (.407) (.295) (.230) 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Women with Children Women with Children 
under 15 Years of Age under 6 Years of Age 
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) 
4j14 = state regulates family 
home day care -.239* -.481 -.350 -.135 
(.130) (.336) (.250) (.175) 
0. (X1,000) .027** -.160 .082*** .042 
(.012) (.111) (.023) (.097) 
oh .015* .041*** .016*** .056* 
(.001) (.011) (.002) (.033) 
Tch . . . -.002* ... -.003 
(.001) (.003) 
7 . . . .090** ... .028 
(.046) (.045) 
Of ... -397.849** ... -189.686 
(164.712) (168.029) 
ClIn 4.266*** 11.455*** 5.227*** 20.486 
(.271) (3.314) (.684) (13.774) 
6F, 2.074*** 5.862** 3.013** 2.069* 
(.508) (2.395) (1.286) (1.124) 
PNS -.411*** -.647*** -.278** -.509*** 
(.068) (.062) (.137) (.120) 
Log likelihood -4,458.64 -4,441.26 -2,466.65 -2,431.11 
Number of observations 3,769 2,060 
NOTE.-Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
* Significant a the .10 level. 
** Significant a the .05 level. 
*** Significant a the .01 level. 
urban area, and the state quality variables lose their significance. The num- 
ber of children from ages 6 to 10 and the number of adults in the household 
are each estimated to have significant negative effects on paid care utili- 
zation. As in specification 1, the family's objective function appears to be 
concave in income and hours of work. There also still appears to be a 
significant negative correlation between ? and X. 
When the interaction terms are added in specification 4, the log likelihood 
increases dramatically. However, virtually all of the estimated coefficients 
lose their individual significance. As in specification 2, the contradictory 
results suggest that the addition of interactions leads to multicollinearity. 
The economic implications of the results from the four structural spec- 
ifications are summarized in table 5. For each specification, table 5 reports 
elasticities of the labor force participation and care utilization decisions 
with respect to changes in after.-tax wages, care costs, and unearned incomes. 
The estimates in table 5 have been obtained by taking means of the relevant 
elasticities calculated for each individual in the sample. 
The results from specifications 1 and 2 indicate that married women's 
employment has a small negative income elasticity and that paid care uti- 
lization among working women has a small positive income elasticity. 
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Table 5 
Estimated Elasticities 
Total Paid Care 
Paid Care Utilization 
Employment Utilization among Workers 
Women with children under 15 years 
of age (specification 1): 
Income elasticity -.048 -.004 .043 
Uncompensated wage elasticity .526 .756 .224 
Uncompensated paid care cost 
elasticity -.088 -.695 -.608 
Women with children under 15 years 
of age (specification 2): 
Income elasticity -.065 .008 .074 
Uncompensated wage elasticity .366 .652 .285 
Uncompensated paid care cost 
elasticity -.070 -.490 -.420 
Women with children under 6 years 
of age (specification 3): 
Income elasticity -.114 -.029 .085 
Uncompensated wage elasticity .384 .406 .022 
Uncompensated paid care cost 
elasticity -.088 -.322 -.235 
Women with children under 6 years 
of age (specification 4): 
Income elasticity -.179 -.073 .106 
Uncompensated wage elasticity .087 .143 .056 
Uncompensated paid care cost 
elasticity -.024 -.248 -.224 
NOTE.-Reported elasticities represent mean of effects evaluated ateach observation. 
Assuming that nonworking women use no paid care, the combination of 
these effects implies that overall utilization is almost perfectly income in- 
elastic. From specifications 3 and 4, mothers of preschoolers appear to be 
more sensitive to changes in unearned income than are mothers generally. 
Employment and paid care utilization for married women with children 
under 15 are estimated to be relatively sensitive to wage changes. The 
uncompensated wage elasticities for employment and paid care utilization 
conditional on employment range from .366 to .526 and .224 to .285, 
respectively. The wage elasticities with respect to employment are close 
to the estimates reported by Kimmel (1993) but higher than those reported 
by Michalopoulos et al. (1992). The wage elasticities for paid care are 
similar to Michalopoulos et al.'s estimate of .17. Table 5 indicates that 
mothers of preschoolers are less sensitive to wage changes with employment 
and conditional paid care elasticities of .087-.384 and .022-.056. 
The results from all four specifications indicate that changes in care 
costs have very little effect on married mothers' employment. The elas- 
ticities from table 5 are similar to estimates reported by Michalopoulos 
et al. and lower than the estimates reported by Blau and Robins (1988), 
Connelly (1992), Ribar (1992), and Kimmel (1993). Care costs appear 
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to have strong negative effects on paid care utilization. As with the wage 
results, the effects are larger for mothers generally than for mothers of 
preschoolers. Overall, the results suggest that increases in care costs 
cause mothers to switch care arrangements but not to leave the la- 
bor force. 
C. Policy Implications 
As a final exercise, the article reports the results of several policy sim- 
ulations in tables 6 and 7. Table 6 lists the predicted total, part-time, and 
full-time employment levels associated with different policies as well as 
predicted levels of paid care utilization conditional on employment status. 
Descriptions of the effects of the policy changes on the CDCTC appear 
in table 7. In particular, table 7 lists changes in the potential annual subsidies 
for part- and full-time workers, the average annual subsidies received by 
all families, and the average annual subsidies received by families who 
claim the CDCTC. As in the previous table, the predicted outcomes in 
tables 6 and 7 represent means of expected values evaluated at each ob- 
servation in the data set. Because of the range of model estimates, predic- 
tions based on all four specifications are reported. 
The first row in table 6 lists the actual employment and care utilization 
rates from the sample. Baseline simulations from specifications 1 and 2 
come very close to replicating the actual results for all women. Both spec- 
ifications slightly underpredict part-time employment and overpredict full- 
time employment. Specification I also appears to overpredict paid care 
utilization for part-timers and underpredict utilization for full-timers. 
Specifications 3 and 4 generate reasonable predictions of the employment 
and care utilization rates for women with preschool children, though the 
predictions are a little less accurate than those for the full sample. Of the 
two specifications, 3 appears to be slightly more accurate in the baseline 
than 4. 
The predicted baseline subsidy amounts for each specification are re- 
ported in table 7. Internal Revenue Service data indicate that the average 
subsidy in 1985 for married families who filed jointly and claimed the 
CDCTC was $340 (U.S. Department of the Treasury 1988). Though these 
data are only roughly comparable, they suggest that subsidies may be 
overpredicted in table 7. 
The first policy change that the article considers is the elimination of 
the CDCTC. Clearly, eliminating the CDCTC is neither a serious nor 
likely policy option. However, the simulation is useful in illustrating the 
sensitivity of employment and care utilization to tax policy in 1985. Es- 
timates reveal that the CDCTC had a strong positive effect on paid care 
utilization, especially paid care utilization among women who worked 
part-time. The CDCTC appears to have had only a modest effect on labor 
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force participation. Eliminating the tax credit would have reduced married 
women's employment by no more than 1 percentage point. 
The second policy change examined in tables 6 and 7 is a proposal to 
make the CDCTC fully refundable. A refundable CDCTC would benefit 
low-income families with little or no tax liability. From table 7, the average 
potential annual subsidies to part- and full-time workers increase by $37 
and $20, respectively. The corresponding increases for mothers of pre- 
school-age children are $48 and $27. These changes have virtually no effect 
on employment or paid care utilization. Indeed, the only discernible effect 
from making the CDCTC refundable is a small increase in paid care uti- 
lization among part-time workers. While refundability has little effect on 
behavior, the policy does have other distributional implications (for dis- 
cussions of this issue, see Barnes 1988 and Robins 1988b). 
The article next considers the effects of replacing the CDCTC with a 
flat 25% subsidy on child care expenditures. Unlike the tax credit, the 
subsidy is fully refundable, is not adjusted for income, and has no upper 
limit. Under this scheme, the potential subsidies for part- and full-time 
workers would increase by roughly 40%. Despite its large cost, the flat 
subsidy would have almost no effect on married women's labor force par- 
ticipation and only a small effect on paid care utilization. As in the two 
previous simulations, most of the increase in paid care use would come 
from women working part-time. 
Another proposal is to increase the eligible expenses under the CDCTC 
to $3,600 for one child and $7,200 for two or more children. In principle, 
this proposal would help middle- and upper-income families whose po- 
tential benefits under the CDCTC have been eroded by inflation.20 How- 
ever, the policy change has little practical effect on average benefits in 
table 7 because few families in the sample incurred expenses in excess of 
the existing CDCTC maximums. Not surprisingly, the behavioral effect 
of increasing eligible expenditures is negligible. 
The article next considers a comprehensive proposal which has been 
put forward by Robins (1988b). He recommended making three modi- 
fications to the current tax credit: (1) make the tax credit refundable, 
(2) increase the eligible expenses to $3,600 and $7,200, and (3) establish a 
sliding scale for expenses starting at 80% for families earning less than 
$10,000. Robins's proposal is very generous-the potential benefits for 
part- and full-time workers increase by 86.3% and 51.6%, respectively. 
20 When it was introduced in 1976, the CDCTC covered 20% of the first $2,000 
in care expenses for one child and the first $4,000 in expenses for two or more 
children. When the CDCTC was changed from a flat percentage to a sliding (30%- 
20%) scale in 1982, the eligible expenses were reset to $2,400 for one child and 
$4,800 for two or more children. These nominal limits have not been subsequently 
adjusted. Thus, the real value of the CDCTC has declined for upper-income families 
since 1976 and for all families since 1982. 
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The results from table 6 indicate his plan leads to a moderate increase in 
part-time employment, a small increase in full-time paid arrangements, 
and a larger increase in part-time paid arrangements. These behavioral 
effects, especially the expansion of paid care use, would increase the realized 
cost of Robins's plan substantially. 
Finally, the article examines two proposals which have been periodically 
discussed by politicians. The first of these is a plan, which was offered by 
President Bush during the 1988 campaign, to extend a large refundable tax 
credit to all families with children. The tax credit would not have been 
conditioned on parents' employment and, thus, would have acted as an 
income subsidy. Table 6 considers the effects of a $1,000 annual subsidy. 
The simulation results indicate that a $1,000 credit would not affect part- 
time employment but would increase paid care utilization among part- 
timers. Full-time employment would decrease slightly, though paid care 
usage among full-timers would not change. 
A second proposal which has been discussed by Senator Daniel Moy- 
nihan (e.g., Moynihan 1987) is to expand the size of exemptions under the 
federal income tax code. Tables 6 and 7 simulate the effects of doubling 
the exemptions for each family member in 1985 from $1,040 to $2,080. 
While the proposal is operationally straightforward, it affects families' em- 
ployment and child care incentives in a complicated way. Increasing the 
size of exemptions reduces the average family's tax liability by sheltering 
a larger portion of income from taxation and lowering the marginal rate 
on the last dollar earned. At the same time, effective subsidies for paid 
care decrease because of the nonrefundability of the CDCTC. This is il- 
lustrated in table 7 where the potential subsidies for part- and full-time 
workers diminish by $43 and $34, respectively. Though there is a range 
of estimates, the simulations in table 6 generally predict that doubling the 
exemptions would increase full-time employment and decrease paid care 
utlization among part-time workers. 
VI. Conclusion 
This article uses 1984-85 data from the SIPP to examine the structure 
of child care costs and the effects of care costs on married women's em- 
ployment and care utilization decisions. The article finds that child care 
expenditures are a nonlinear function of hours of work. In particular, 
expenditures appear to entail a substantial fixed component as well as a 
nonlinear marginal component. A structural discrete-choice labor supply 
and care utilization model is estimated. The econometric methodology 
allows women's work and child care decisions to be endogenous deter- 
minants of one another and accounts for nonlinearities in families' budget 
constraints which arise from the care expenditure function and the U.S. 
tax system. Estimates based on this model indicate that married women's 
labor supply is relatively insensitive to changes in care costs. Child care 
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subsidy programs such as the CDCTC appear to influence women's care 
decisions but have little effect on their employment. 
While the article provides interesting and important results, several av- 
enues remain open for future research. A serious limitation in the present 
analysis is the broad definition of care modes. Grouping all purchased care 
into one category simplifies estimation but may mask differences in costs, 
quality, and preferences. More complicated structural econometric tech- 
niques (e.g., the Simulated Method of Moments estimator for nonlinear 
budget sets recently developed by Keane and Moffitt [1991]) which allow 
for expanded choice sets should be considered. Another constraint on the 
analysis is the lack of direct information on the quality attributes of care. 
State-level data are used; however, community- and center-specific infor- 
mation would be more appropriate. Data on quality "outcomes" such as 
developmental effects would also be helpful. Future work should also con- 
sider other family decisions such as husband's labor supply and parents' 
fertility. Both decisions increase the dimensionality of the problem. A 
model of joint family labor supply would be useful in examining the de- 
terminants of shift work; a model of fertility would be useful in examining 
quality and quantity trade-offs. A final avenue would be to extend the 
analysis to single-parent families. Here program participation decisions 
complicate the budget constraint and increase the dimensionality of the 
problem. Nevertheless, such an analysis would help to inform the debate 
on the relationship between child care and economic self-sufficiency. 
Appendix A 
Derivation of Structural Labor Supply and Care Utilization 
Likelihood Function 
Denote the maternal labor supply choices as Ho, H1, and H2. Let 
D(H, F) = Y(H, F) - OCY(H, F)2 - OhH2 
+ PF + YchY(H5 F)H + y~fY(H, F)F, 
and let 
D(Ho, 0) - D(H2, 0) _ 
H2 
D(HI, 0) - D(H2, 0) _ 
Q2 = I-1-H 
H2- Hi 
D(H2, 0)- D(H2 1) 
H2 
Q = D(HI, 1) - D(H2, 0) + HxV'X - 
I2- Hi 
D(HO, 0) - D(H2, 1) _ 6'Z y'X, 
H2 
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Q6= D(Hi, 0) - D(H2, 1) - H2NJX _ 875 
H2- HI 
D(Hi, 1) - D(H2, 1)_ aZ -'X, 
H2- I 
QS = D(Ho, 0) - D(HI, 1) - X 
HI 
Q = D(Ho, 0) - D(HI, 1) _ WzW5 
H. 
State 1: if H Ho and F 0, 
U(Y(Ho, 0), Ho, 0)> U(Y(H1, 0), H1, 0) implies rj < Q8, 
U(Y(Ho, 0), Ho, 0)> U(Y(H2, 0), H2, 0) implies Q1 
U(Y(Ho, 0), Ho0 0) > U(Y(H, 1), Hi, 1) implies r1 + e < Q10, 
U(Y(Ho, 0), Ho, 0) > U(Y(H2, 1), H2, 1) implies 1 + g < Q5, 
W1 = min(Q1, Q8), W2 = min(Q5, Q10), 
rWI rW2-7 
prob(H = Ho0 F 0) = f f- f(g )d0d 
State 2: if H = H1 and F 0 ,. 
U(Y(H1, 0), H1, 0) > U(Y(Ho, 0), Ho, 0) implies rl > Q8, 
U(Y(H1, 0), Hi, 0) > U(Y(H2, 0), H2, 0) implies 11 <Q2, 
U(Y(H1, 0), H1, 0) > U(Y(H1, 1), Hi, 1) implies ? < Q9, 
H2H H 
T2 = (Q6 - Q8) 2H , T3 = min(Q3, Q9), T4 = min(T2, Q9), H2 
oT3 rQ2 
prob(H = H1, F = 0) = f ff(g, j)djd 
rT4 Q6-4[H2/(H2-Hl)] 
+ I(Q3 < Qs) JJ f(c, r)drd&. 
Q3 Q8 
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State 3: if H = H2 and F = 0, 
U(Y(H2, 0), H2, 0) > U(Y(HO, 0), HO, 0) implies i' > Q1, 
U(Y(H2, 0), H2, 0)> U(Y(H1, 0), H1, 0) implies il > Q2, 
U(Y(H2, 0), H2, 0) > U(Y(H2, 1), H2, 1) implies g < 
U(Y(H25 O), H25 O) >U(Y(H,, 1), Hi, 1) implies q - g H- 
> 
Q1 2-2H 
R. = max(Q1, Q2), R2 = (R - Q4) H1 R3 = min(Q3, R2), 
pR3 OD 
prob(H = H2, F = 0) = f f f(F, i)rdA 
-oo I 
rQ3r 
+ I(R2 < Q3) JJ f(, j)dqd?. 
R2 Q4+F,[HII(H2-H,)] 
State 4: if H = H1 and F = 1, 
U(Y(H1, 1), H1, 1) > U(Y(Ho, 0), Ho, 0) implies i1 + > Q1o, 
U(Y(Hi, 1), H1, 1) > U(Y(Hi, 0), Hi, 0) implies ? > Q9, 
U(Y(HI, 1), Hi 5 1) > U(Y(H2, 0), H2, 0) implies - H 
- < Q' H2 - H1 
U(Y(H1, 1), H1, 1) > U(Y(H2, 1), H2, 1) implies rl + g < Q75 
V1 = (Q1o- H2Hi 5 V3 = max(V1, Qq), V4 = max(Q3, Qs), 
H2 
r? Q7 
prob(H = H1, F = 1) = Jv4 f(F ,) 
rQ3 rQ4+6[Hj1(H2-Hj)] 
+ I(Q3 > Qs) JVJf(0 medqd? 
State 5: if H = H2 and F = 1, 
U(Y(H2, 1), H2, 1) > U(Y(HO, 0), Ho 0) implies i , + > Q5, 
U(Y(H25 1), H25 1) >U(Y(H1, 0), H1, 0) implies ii + g H2 > Q'5 
H2 - H Q 
A Model of Child Care 593 
U(Y(H2, 1), H2, 1) > U(Y(H2, 0), H2, 0) implies ? > Q3, 
U(Y(H2, 1), H2, 1) > U(Y(HI1, 1), H1, 1) implies i1 + 6 > Q7, 
S = max(Q5, Q7), S2 = (Q6 - S) 2- , S3 = max(Q3, S2), 
HI 
prob(H = H2, F = 1) = f(g, ,)dqd, 
3 I-? 
rS2 '?? 
+ I(Q3 <52) L [ f(i, medqd 
Q3 Q6? F-1_21(H2 H )] 
Appendix B 
Derivation of the Child Care Expenditure Likelihood Functions 
Consider a reduced-form Tobit specification for monthly hours of 
work: 
H* = FhX,, + 6h, 
I0 if H* _< 0 
H = g 
H* if H* > 0. 
Conditional on hours being positive, the family's care utilization decision 
is observed. A reduced-form description of the decision to pay for care, 
F, can be written 
F FjXf+ Sf, 
? (do not pay for care) if F* < 0O 
L1 (pay for care) if FP > 0. 
Expenditures are observed conditional on hours and the decision to pay 
for care being positive. Expenditures above P,, ($100 per week and $433 
per month) are censored at PM. Finally, let the error terms 1,h, sf, and 
be distributed as 
?Xh h O Phf (Th p I Gh6  
Sf Nt ? ,P24 _ 
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Let 
Z H- FXh Zf- F f, 
In PF-g(H, D; A) In P, - g(H, D; A) 
Zp , 
Then 
prob(H = 0) = D(Zh), 
Zf 
prob(H > 0, F = 0) = o7-' 02(Zh, 7f; p,,f)dFf, 
prob(H > 0, F = 1, PF < P,) 
c00 
= (6hO0 f 03(Zh, ?f, Zp; Phf, Pl, p2)d~f, 
prob(H > 0, F = 1, PF= P,2) 
- 6h 
j 
03(Zh, ?f, 4*; Phf, Pl, P2)d; dsf- 
Zf Zm7 
Appendix C 
Table C1 
Joint Log Wage, Labor Force Participation Results 
Dependent Variables 
Labor Force 
Log Wage Participation 
Variable Result SE Result SE 
Intercept -.1435 .2963 -.0817 .5050 
Age .0159 .0149 .0205 .0250 
Age2 a -.0333 .0217 -.0955 ** .0354 
Experience .0437*** .0054 .1133*** .0064 
Experience2 a - .0508 ** .0141 -.1333*** .0167 
Education .0738*** .0043 .0750*** .0110 
State unemployment -.0 1 57* .0066 -.0461 ** .0144 
Average annual private-sector earnings 
in stateb .0205*** .0069 .0386 .0247 
South .0380 .0281 .0860 .0612 
Metropolitan area .0940**-* .0287 .0969* .0542 
Nonwhite .0586 .0358 .2542*** .0739 
Unearned incomeb ... ... -.1 146 ** .0162 
Number of children 0-2 years of age ... ... -.5268*** .0464 
Number of children 3-5 years of age ... ... -.2416*** .0409 
Number of children 6-10 years of age ... ... -.0489 .0305 
Number of adults ... ... .0474' .0212 
Husband's education ... ... -.0075 .0098 
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Table C1 (Continued) 
Dependent Variables 
Labor Force 
Log Wage Participation 
Variable Result SE Result SE 
Average annual service-sector earnings 
in state ... ... -.0640** .0256 
State child:staff ratio ... ... -.0646 .0519 
State checks criminal records ... ... .0757 .0599 
State regulates family home day care ... ... -.0925* .0486 
a .5139*** .0102 ... ... 
p .3002*** .0969 ... ... 
Log likelihood -3,646.34 
Number of observations 3,769 
Variable has been divided by 100. 
Variable has been divided by 1,000. 
* Significant a the .10 level. 
** Significant a the .05 level. 
*** Significant a the .01 level. 
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